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Bankruptcy Taxes and Other Filing Facts: A
Commentary on Professor Bowers
Carl S. Bjerre*
Advising law students on how to read cases, Karl Llewellyn
admonished them, "You will be impatient with the facts to the
precise extent to which you need them."1 This admonition re-
mains well taken by those of us who, under the benign or malign
influence of our law student experience, now like to spend our
time sitting around thinking about revising or repealing com-
mercial statutes.
Professor James W. Bowers's front-line proposal, to -abolish
the Article 9 filing system,2 is naturally appealing, to any practi-
tioner who has toiled for long in the system's vineyards, but out-
right abolition would injure the same exploited filers in whose
interest the proposal is made. For the filing system does benefit
filers in addition to searchers and bureaucrats, and simply prun-
ing back its overgrown vines would allow it to continue to benefit
both filers and searchers, while striking a better balance between
taxing the former and enriching the latter. To further this ac-
commodationist goal, Part I of this Paper proposes adapting Pro-
fessor Bowers's abolitionist stance to a sliding scale, so that only
the most onerous portions of existing filing requirements would
be abolished, while the others would remain in place. Part II of
this Paper briefly considers some of the benefits of Professor
Bowers's second choice, privatizing the filing system,3 an idea
* Attorney, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, New York City. Many
thanks to Paul Shupack and Linda Hayman.
1. K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAmBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAw AND rrs STUDY 56
(1960). The passage continues, in a characteristic vein:
If you do not need them, if you already have some knowledge of the
background of the case, the facts will not be boring; they will interest
you. If they pester and upset you, that is a sign that you know so little
about what the case means in life that these facts need desperate study.
2. James W. Bowers, Of Bureaucrats' Brothers-in-Law and Bankruptcy
Taxes: Article 9 Filing Systems and the Market for Information, 79 Mm-N. L.
REv. 721, 722-23 (1995).
3. Id. at 742-43.
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that turns out to be well suited to promoting Part rs
accommodationism.
I. PARTIAL ABOLITION
It is hard to disagree with Professor Bowers's central propo-
sition that the Article 9 filing system, insofar as it requires filers
to supply information for the benefit of later searchers, consti-
tutes a tax. Apologists for this transfer of wealth may argue that
nearly every filer acts also as a searcher (whether in the same or
different transactions), so that the tax payments tend to flow
back to their payors over time (much as the victim of a long-
enough running Ponzi scheme may eventually recover her in-
vestment). But this argument is true, if at all, only because ex-
isting rules of law distort the marketplace by making available
large amounts of information at bargain-basement rates. Only
in such an environment is it rational for filers, before they file, to
search for prior filings against their debtor even when other dili-
gence devices would adequately address the filer's priority
concerns.
4
Because filers themselves also benefit by their filings, how-
ever, the tax metaphor doesn't do justice to its tenor. The im-
agery would usefully be enriched if we described the filing
system not only as a tax, but also as an insurance policy.5 The
principal risk that filers seek insurance against is, as Professor
4. Such an environment similarly makes it rational for the filer's law firm,
as a risk-averse institution, to make a small search-fee disbursement on its cli-
ent's behalf and to require the borrower's law firm to opine on the absence of
conflicts with any prior filings.
A possible implication of Bowers with respect to such opinions should be
negated. See Bowers, supra note 2, at 730-31. Security interest opinions in the
filing context rarely require opining counsel to determine matters extrinsic to
the filing. Rather, they assume away the question of whether the borrower has
rights in the collateral, and express no opinion as to priority, except to note the
presence or absence of prior conflicting filings. See Special Report by the TriBar
Opinion Committee: U.C.C. Security Interest Opinions, 49 Bus. LAw. 359, 380-
83 (1993).
5. One hopes that the formal distinctions, at least, between a tax and an
insurance policy will remain recognizable as the national health-care reform
controversy continues.
A related metaphor for filing is that of staking a claim. Douglas G. Baird,
Notice Filing and the Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 12 J. LEGAL STun. 53,
62-63 (1983) (citing ALAN ScHwARTz & ROBERT E. ScoTT, CoMmERcIAL TRANSAC-
TIONs: PR iNCPLEs AND PoLicis 594-97 (1982); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature
and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977)). This phrase
highlights the exclusionary aspects of perfection, as the insurance metaphor
fails to do, but the insurance metaphor highlights the contingent, second-best,
loss-protective aspect of collateral, as the mining metaphor fails to do.
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Bowers points out, the borrower's bankruptcy and the avoidance
of unperfected security interests. 6 In a more common and, ac-
cordingly, less well-tailored metaphor, filing simply represents
the price that lenders pay to beat the bankruptcy trustee.
Until UCC section 9-301(1)(b) is repealed 7 or secured trans-
actions are abolished,8 secured lenders will require access to
some sort of bankruptcy insurance. This insurance must be im-
plemented under the auspices of (although not necessarily imple-
mented by9) the state, because it operates by curtailing the
rights of strangers to the transaction, something that we gener-
ally don't permit private actors to do, no matter how efficient it
6. See Bowers, supra note 2, at 732-33; 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (Supp. V 1993).
But the figure of speech that Professor Bowers uses in this context might use-
fully be enriched, too. The trustee may have the powers of Tinkerbell, but from
a filer's point of view the trustee also has the motivations of Captain Hook
Some insurable risks (one thinks of earthquakes or illnesses) are inelucta-
ble, but the bankruptcy trustee's power to avoid unperfected security interests is
not: a stroke of the right statutory pens could abolish it. Those who consider
society's failure to do so unjustifiable (or even consider the bankruptcy regime as
a whole bad or unworkable) might find the insurance metaphor for filing to be
inapt, and I thank Professor Bowers for the observation that it is a euphemism
for protection money.
7. See James J. White, Revising Article 9 to Reduce Wasteful Litigation, 26
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 823 (1993) (proposing repeal of provision subordinating un-
perfected security interests to lien creditors).
8. This measure would be the logical consummation of an analysis that
found security interests to be socially unjustifiable. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz,
Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J.
LEGAL STuD. 1 (1981). See also SCHwARTz & ScoTr, supra note 5, at 558 ("Code
drafters should consider selective prohibition rather than continued encourage-
ment of secured transactions."). On the other hand, a number of commentators
have advanced grounds on which security interests may indeed be socially justi-
fiable. See, e.g., James W. Bowers, Whither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law,
Bankruptcy Theory, and the Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA.
L. REv. 27, 57-68 (1991); see generally Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney,
Jr., A Property.Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtors' Choiees Seri-
ously, 80 VA. L. REv. 2021 (1994) (advancing furtherance of debtors' freedom to
alienate properly as ground for security interests); Paul M. Shupack, Solving the
Puzzle of Secured Transactions 41 RUTGERS L. REv. 1067 (1989) (arguing that
possible efficiency gains justify security interests).
With a relatively simple change in law, one could convert the puzzle of se-
cured transactions from a social puzzle to a private-actor based puzzle. Specifi-
cally, one could make negative pledge covenants (i.e., promises not to grant
security interests) enforceable against third parties by means of the Article 9
filing system, so that borrowers could credibly assure negative pledgees that no
later-arising consensual claims would have superior property interests. Borrow-
ers and their negative pledgees would thus be able to opt out of the regime that
makes security interests possible, in effect abolishing secured transactions for
themselves without the need for society to abolish them for everyone. I hope to
explore this idea in a later paper.
9. See infra part II (advocating a private filing system).
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would be. In other words, secured lenders need the state to as-
sure them that their security interest will be perfected once they
take some specified action.
Apart from concerns about ostensible ownership,' 0 which do
not trouble Professor Bowers," there is no reason to require the
specified action to involve the filing of a financing statement or
other creation of a public record. One can envision a variety of
cheap alternatives to filing that do not necessarily generate un-
acceptable fraud risks. Article 9 could provide for perfection to
depend on the payment of a stamp tax, or on the state issuing of
a certificate that is not a matter of public record,' 2 or on no re-
quired action at all,' 3 or on any number of more or less entertain-
ing alternatives (including the affixing of a star to the belly'4 of a
duly authorized officer of the lender).
On the other hand, there is no reason that the action re-
quired for perfection should purposefully avoid addressing con-
cerns about ostensible ownership. There is nothing inherently
evil in making information available to inquirers, and nothing
inherently desirable in denying it to them; an injustice arises
only if the system conscripts more information for the benefit of
inquirers than filers can readily provide. If a lender can provide
given information to the world easily and cheaply,' 5 then a sys-
tem that requires her to provide it imposes only a negligible tax
10. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Own-
ership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REv. 175 (1983)(discussing the UCC's treatment of the "ostensible ownership" problem); Charles
W. Mooney, Jr., The Mystery and Myth of "Ostensible Ownership" and Article 9
Filing: A Critique of Proposals to Extend Filing Requirements to Leases, 39 ALA.
L. REV. 683 (1988) (same).
11. See Bowers, supra note 2, at 734-36 (arguing that the market for infor-
mation represents a workable solution because prospective secured lenders will
bargain with debtors in any case).
12. Cf Peter A. Alces, Abolish the Article 9 Filing System, 79 Mm-N. L. REV.
679, 708-13 (1995) (proposing a system of literal insurance, an interesting illu-
mination of the insurance metaphor for the existing system).
13. See White, supra note 7, at 826.
14. See T.S. GEISEL (A/i/A DR. SEuss), THE SNEETCHES AND OTHER STORIES(1961) (relating a fable about people's urge to claim superiority over others
based on superficial differences from them).
The fable also teaches that if stars are too easily available, they tend to
spread to too many bellies, thus diluting star-based superiority and prompting
people to seize on other bases on which to claim superiority. Id. at 11-12, 15-22.
This lesson should be borne cautiously in mind in connection with Professor
White's proposal for automatic perfection. White, supra note 7, at 823-26.
15. Both of these adverbs imply the absence of lawyers. Both are also, how-
ever, less strong than "costlessly." See Bowers, supra note 2, at 727.
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and is likely to confer a net social benefit.16 Furthermore, filing
itself17 represents a means of providing information to the world
that is far cheaper and easier than either the alternative consid-
ered by the original Reporters for Article 918 or any other true
public-notice alternative that comes to mind.19
On the spectrum between retaining the status quo and abol-
ishing the filing system altogether, there are numerous points at
which the system could continue to address the ostensible owner-
ship problem while subjecting filers to a greatly reduced tax bur-
den. My own rough assessment of the optimal point on this
spectrum calls for reshaping the filing requirements in three par-
ticular ways. First, collateral descriptions should be made op-
tional. Second, filers should not be required to supply any
debtor-related details other than its name and address. Finally,
filers should perhaps be required to supply additional details
concerning their own identity and contact information. These in-
cremental, accommodationist proposals may lack the inherent
panache of more sweeping approaches, but they derive a more
16. This net benefit could even be production of a level of information disclo-
sure that more closely approaches optimality than would the market for infor-
mation alone. In the absence of disclosure requirements, information may tend
to be underproduced, due to the combination of its costliness and its public goods
quality (i.e., the difficulty of protecting it from exploitation by free riders). See,
e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the
Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFsTRA L. REV. 9, 32 (1984). By contrast,
disclosure requirements may err in the opposite direction, mandating produc-
tion of more information than a buyer would be willing to bargain for. By retain-
ing a filing requirement but (as outlined below) keeping its contents minimal,
one might strike a rough balance between the two risks.
17. In this context, filing refers to a mechanism considered separately from
Article 9's current disclosure and place-of-filing requirements.
18. The key to [this] proposal was the imposition of a duty on a secured
party to use due diligence to see that his debtor's financial statements
made full disclosure of the security interest; creditors and purchasers
misled by improper statements were to have a right of recovery, to the
extent of loss caused by good faith reliance, not only against the issuer
of the statement but against a secured party who had failed to perform
his policing duty.
1 GRmrr GILMORE, SEcuRTY INTERESTS iN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 15.1, at
464 (1965). Douglas Baird points out the cost that would have been imposed by
after-the-fact inquiries about fulfillment of this monitoring duty, in addition to
the cost of monitoring per se. See Baird, supra note 5, at 60.
19. The question of potential feasible alternatives to filing constitutes "the
reef on which this ingenious and attractive argument [i.e., the one advanced in
Professor Bowers's epigraph] usually founders." 1 GLMoRE, supra note 18, at
464. Under the star-on-belly alternative referred to in the text, large numbers of
middle-aged bank officers would wind up walking around partially unclothed-a
severe negative externality.
1995]
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humble appeal from close attention to the facts of the filing pro-
cess-facts that may breed impatience.
A. COLLATEPAL DESCRIPTIONS
Currently, financing statements must include "a statement
indicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral"20 but,
consistent with Article 9's philosophy of notice filing,21 the state-
ment need not be specific enough to enable a searcher to deter-
mine whether particular property is encumbered.22 The statute
thus burdens filers with the cost (including the legal risks of er-
ror 23) of drafting an adequate collateral description even though,
in most cases other than single-asset filings or all-assets filings,
the description will be of limited informational value to any fu-
ture searcher.24 Requiring collateral descriptions in many such
20. U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1990).
21. Id. § 9-402 cmt. 2.
22. See id. § 9-110.
23. At least one prominent law firm's routine procedure, to avert the possi-
bility of error, involves filing the entirety of its security agreements as attach-
ments to its financing statements. Cf 2 THoMAs M. QUINN, QUJN'S UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY AND LAW DIGEST 9-435 (1991) (characterizing
the collateral description as "an all too fertile source of misery").
UCC § 9-110's reasonable identification standard imposes a risk similar in
kind, though presumably not in degree, to the post hoc inquiries suggested by
Baird, supra note 5, at 65-66, in the context of financial statement disclosure. A
larger point is that filing, like other legal formalities, is intended to serve a
"channelling" finction, assuring private actors that their formally-expressed in-
tentions will be respected by the courts. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and
Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 801-03 (1941). The unpredictabilities of the "rea-
sonable description" requirement deprive filing of some of these channelling
benefits.
24. Any extrinsic reference, such as reference to provisions of a contract,
limits a description's usefulness.
Descriptions of floating interests are also of limited use to searchers, yet
substantial cost to filers. Consider a typical asset securitization transaction in
which the collateral constitutes a specified, floating percentage of the debtor's
accounts receivable meeting certain eligibility criteria. In the understandable
neurosis that is brought on by the reasonable identification requirement, filers
usually feel compelled to describe these accounts receivable by means of several
pages' worth of mutually intertwined, verbally convoluted definitions, each of
which may be subject to negotiations in the underlying documentation until the
dosing of the transaction. A bleary-eyed word-processor's inadvertent omission
from the financing statement of a single phrase from one of those paragraphs
could prove fatal to perfection. Moreover, adding insult to injury, all of the care,
expense, and risk that a filer puts into a successful filing will be of little use to
the later searcher who, due to the floating nature of the collateral, cannot learn
from the filing whether a given account is encumbered.
At the other extreme, far less care need be lavished on a traditional single-
asset filing. Yet the informational benefits to any later searcher from such a
collateral description will concomitantly often be less, as well. Even without a
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cases betrays a misplaced faith in a stable, communicative corre-
spondence between words and things. For this reason, the re-
quirement of a collateral description should be abolished.25 The
filing of a financing statement without a collateral description
would represent a presumptive encumbrance of all of the debtor's
assets, and searchers would have to determine through other
means whether the actual security interest was, and would re-
main, satisfactorily narrower. This burden allocation would
merely extend the diligence burden imposed on searchers to-
day,26 and would reallocate more justly the benefits and burdens
of filing.
To abolish the requirement of collateral descriptions is not
necessarily to abolish collateral descriptions. The filing system
could, and should, continue to accommodate collateral descrip-
tions offered by filers on a voluntary basis; these collateral de-
scriptions, when provided, would act as limitations on the filer's
security interest just as they do under current law.27 A debtor
contemplating it being sufficiently worthwhile to searchers, and
by extension, to itself, for the description to appear of record
could include this issue in the mix of issues over which it bar-
collateral description, the searcher who came across a filing in favor of a post-
age-meter vending company could be quite confident that that filer did not have
a lien on, say, the accounts or general intangibles of the debtor.
25. A similar proposal is advanced as a natural extension of existing collat-
eral description rules in Morris G. Shanker, A Proposal for a Simplified All-
Embracing Security Interest, 14 UCC L.J. 23 (1981); see also Douglas G. Baird,
Security Interests Reconsidered, 80 V-. L. REv. 2249, 2256 (1994) ("[1It may not
be cost effective to build a system that requires the financing statement to have
any description of the collateral.").
An equally logical, but unjust, solution to the problem of filer effort without
corresponding searcher benefit would be to increase the burden on the filer, re-
quiring that collateral descriptions make clear precisely what property is en-
cumbered. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Computerization of the Article 9 Filing System:
Thoughts on Building the Electronic Highway, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Sum-
mer 1992, at 5, 35-36 (pointing out that this would be an aid to speed and
reliability).
26. "The notice required by a notice filing statute can never be more than a
starting point for further investigations." 1 GiLMORE, supra note 18, § 15.3, at
470; see also U.C.C. § 9-402 cmt. 2 (discussing notice filing).
Even under the current regime, searchers may be less interested in collat-
eral descriptions than simply in the filer's identity; LEXIS and Westlaw offer on-
line searches of, and presumably make a profit from, debtor and filer informa-
tion without needing to include collateral descriptions on-line. It would be use-
ful to know what proportion of on-line searchers, under what circumstances,
proceed to procure hard copies of filings to check collateral descriptions.
27. Cf Shanker, supra note 25, at 27 n.16 ("Perhaps an official form could




gains with its filer, possibly compensating the filer for the trouble
and the risk of the description being later held, or alleged to be,
inadequate. Indeed, many debtors granting a security interest in
only limited assets would have a strong incentive contractually
to require the filer to disclose to inquirers the limited coverage of
the security agreement. (Indeed, order to protect inquirers
against the possibility of later a broadening the security agree-
ment, such debtors would even have an incentive contractually to
require the filer to execute subordination agreements in favor of
the inquirers.) Depending on the expected frequency and attend-
ant cost to the filer of accommodating inquirers under such con-
tractual requirements, the filer could rationally choose to obviate
the requirements by filing a collateral description instead.28 As a
result, collateral descriptions would appear only in those cases
where interested parties considered them worthwhile, rather
than appearing in all cases by statutory fiat.2 9 Professor Bow-
ers's market for information would thus operate, at least in part,
within the structure of the filing system.
Searchers would, of course, prefer Article 9 at least to con-
tinue requiring filers to show of record the Code-defined types of
collateral in which the filer claimed an interest (in order, for ex-
ample, that prospective accounts receivable factors would not be
put to the burden of inquiring about previous equipment-based
lenders). Although it is difficult to argue in the abstract that im-
posing such a requirement presents too burdensome a tax,30 we
should not neglect the hidden costs involved in this apparently
minor burden. It imposes a great penalty on the filer who unsuc-
cessfully navigates her way through Article 9's increasingly com-
plex scheme of classificational rubrics. Not everyone, and not
every court, will classify a given item of collateral in the same
way, and the classification exercise will grow even more chal-
28. If the filer had initially filed without a collateral description, it could
reverse that decision by amending the filing to include a collateral description.
See also infra note 42 (discussing more speculative ways in which the system
might elicit collateral descriptions or other optional filing information).
29. Cf Bowers, supra note 2, at 727 ("[No one but the most optimistic fan of
bureaucratic decision-making is apt to believe that the [current] system is likely
either to collect or disseminate the optimal quantity and quality of
information.").
30. See Shanker, supra note 25, at 25 (characterizing collateral classifica-
tion as an "easy trick of the trade," though for the purpose of arguing that the
unadvised should not be penalized for not knowing how to pull it off).
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lenging as instruments, investment property, deposit accounts,
and other types of collateral are folded into the filing system.31
B. DEBTOR DETAILS VERSUS FILER DETAILS.
Some proposals for filing reform would, in the name of facili-
tating searches, require the filer to set forth the debtor's tax-
payer identification number in addition to, or in lieu of, its name
and address.3 2 This number may be known to lenders that have
investigated individual borrowers' credit records, but it bears no
other relevance to most transactions that generate filings. Thus,
the filer would have to obtain it for the sole purpose of the filing,
and the costs of doing so (including, again, the legal costs of er-
ror3 3) would create a substantial systemic burden, increasing
Professor Bowers's tax.
31. In addition to new types of collateral becoming covered by filing, at least
one type of collateral already covered by filing may be subdivided into two types.
See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB
STUDY GROUP, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9: REPORT 45 (1992) (ad-
dressing treatment of general intangibles constituting accounts receivable ver-
sus other general intangibles).
Filing's growing applicability increases the likelihood of filing being an ap-
propriate perfection mechanism but also increases the likelihood for misidentify-
ing a given item of filing collateral. Nor can the filer in doubt cannot simply
check off the boxes for all reasonable possible classifications, without inviting
debtor protests or, what amounts to the same thing, attorney wrangling.
32. See PETER A. ALOES & ROBERT M. LLOYD, REPORT OF THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 FILING SYSTEM TASK FORCE TO THE PERMANENT EDITO-
RIAL BoARD's ARTICLE 9 STUDY COMMITTEE 24 (Working Doc. No. M4-26, May 1,
1991); Jan Whitehead Swift, The UCC Filing System and the Need for Reform,
26 UCC L.J. 283, 294 (1994). Some states have already adopted this require-
ment in non-uniform amendments. See BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED
TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE I 2.09[1][c] (1993).
Other proposals would require filers to include the debtor's gender and
either individual birthdate or jurisdiction and form of organization. Similar ar-
guments would apply to these requirements, with the possible exception of the
debtor's jurisdiction of organization if this requirement were linked to a change
in Article 9's place-of-filing rules. See infra note 44 (discussing altering place of
filing rules).
33. Some indication of the size of problems courted by more extensive
debtor-related filing requirements can be had by considering the filing problems
related to debtors' trade names under current law. See ALOES & LLOYD, supra
note 32, at 12-13; Juliana J. Zekan, The Name Game -Playing to Win Under § 9-
402 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 19 HOFSTRA L. REv. 365 (1990). It is hard
to be more sanguine about filers correctly determining their debtors' taxpayer
identification numbers, jurisdiction, and form of organization than about filers
correctly determining their debtors' names. Even without plumbing the depths
of Murphian analysis, see Bowers, supra note 6, one can predict a certain
number of financing statement misspecifications even of such a normally obvi-
ous datum as an individual debtor's gender.
1995]
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Even if the filer otherwise knows the data, as it would
debtor's jurisdiction and form of organization in a lawyered
transaction, ensuring that it appears correctly on the filings, be-
cause administrative persons having little contact with the rest
of the transaction usually prepare the filings, and as the number
of data or the number of links in the transmission chain increase,
so do the chances of fatal error and the costs of preventing it. 4
Proposals to rescue filers from errors in this information, for ex-
ample by providing for such errors to be classified by fiat as "not
seriously misleading,"3 5 would reduce the legal costs of error, but
would not reduce the administrative compliance costs to unad-
vised parties.
The filer can supply details about itself, by contrast, with
less difficulty, and one could consider increasing a filer's obliga-
tion to do so, without being untrue to filer/searcher accommoda-
tionism. To the extent that collateral descriptions become less
abundant or precise, the pressure on searchers to obtain infor-
mation in the marketplace will tend to increase, and certain ad-
ditional data concerning filers could help to hook up the
information shoppers with the right sellers. For example, the
telephone and fax numbers of an appropriate officer of the se-
cured party would potentially be helpful to searchers and un-
burdensome to filers. A more interesting possibility would be to
require disclosure of whether the secured party holds its security
interest for itself or as agent for others.3 6 Extensions of the same
logic could even call for requiring secured parties to file amend-
ments from time to time to keep the foregoing information cur-
rent, or for revising the rule of section 9-302(2) to require that an
assignee file a record of its assignment in order to remain per-
fected; however, the resulting benefit to searchers would surely
34. These factors are particularly noteworthy in the case of taxpayer identi-
fication numbers. "Small typographical errors could easily go undetected with
disastrous results.... To avoid the risk of losing perfection, secured creditors
could be faced with the need to institute numerous costly cross-checks in order
to assure accuracy." ALCES & LLOYD, supra note 32, at 24; see also LoPucki,
supra note 25, at 20-22 (discussing other difficulties with, as well as benefits
from, using taxpayer identification numbers).
35. U.C.C. § 9-402(8). See also Swift, supra note 32, at 294 (advancing this
idea with respect to taxpayer identification numbers).
36. This raises issues related to "trafficking" in financing statements, in-
cluding those litigated most notoriously in In re E.A. Fretz Co., 565 F.2d 366
(5th Cir. 1978) (after debtor declares bankruptcy, unsecured creditors may not
secure claims by assignment to senior lienor under "omnibus" financing state-
ment). A secured party holding as representative is clearly better situated to




fail to justify the burden to filers imposed by either of these
measures.
H. PRIVATIZATION THE FILING SYSTEM
Filers' need for a state-blessed procedure, whatever its pre-
cise contours, through which to secure insurance against third-
party claims does not imply any need for the state to actively
participate in the procedure. The filing system may or may not
constitute a natural monopoly,37 but the only realistic way to
gather the facts on that question is to enable competition to take
place, letting entrepreneurs rush in and seeing if any of them
prosper. The advent of computerization provides new grounds
for hope that entrepreneurs will find sufficient profit opportuni-
ties in this area,38 so that "organizational" and "technological
matters may turn out to be closely linked."3 9
Article 9 could permit orderly relinquishment of the current
monopoly by providing for the perfection upon filing either with
the state, or with any private, licensed filing maintenance ser-
vice. Such an enabling of private filing would be reminiscent of
the "contracting out" used increasingly in other theretofore-gov-
ernmental functions.40 The main difference would consist of
37. See Bowers, supra note 2, at 737.
38. See Ronald C.C. Cuming, Computerization of Personal Property Security
Registries: What the Canadian Experience Presages for the United States, 23
UCC L.J. 331, 334 n.18 (1991) (arguing that computerization reduces cost and
increases "revenues to the point that some systems produce significant income
for provincial governments"). States might be loath to let these revenues be
taken over by the private sector. See Paul M. Shupack, On Boundaries and Defi-
nitions: A Commentary on Dean Baird, 80 VA. L. Rav. 2273, 2273 n.1 (1994).
But this is no reason for revisionists not to fight the good fight.
39. But see Bowers, supra note 2, at 733 (drawing a distinction between the
two).
40. It is also already under consideration for Article 9. See AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE & NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMIussIoNERs ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REVISED ARTICLE 9 PARTS 4 & 5, FEB. 10,
1995 DRAFT 42 (1995).
Contracting out the filing-receiving function should be distinguished from
the current, more limited practice of selling state-received filing information to
private information resellers such as LEXIS or Westlaw.
Contracting out to a single party is less promising than contracting out to
multiple, competing parties. If the government contracts out to only a single
party, it must monitor that party to ensure adequate performance unless, in a
potentially endless regression, the monitoring itself is contracted out. There is
little reason to believe that the government can do better at the monitoring task
than it can at the underlying, contracted-out task. "Sed quis custediet ipsos cus-
todes?" JuvENAL, SATIRES VI, 11. 347-48 in JuvENAL AND PERSius 110 (G.G. Ram-
say ed. & trans. 1965) (1918).
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holding the offer to contract open to any party meeting the licens-
ing standards, rather than just to the bidder promising to charge
the lowest prices.41 These licensing standards could be limited
simply to maintaining electronic access, 42 at some maximum fee,
to filings received by the licensee and putting up a bond covering
possible filer or searcher losses. Licensees or prospective licen-
sees would have some incentive to lobby states to keep their re-
spective licensing requirements uniform, or at least mutually
consistent, and even to keep their filing requirements to the
pared-back standard proposed in Part J.43 Corporation law's so-
called race for the bottom is another, less speculative possible
mechanism for moderating licensing and filing requirements.44
Competing filing maintenance services would survive only
by performing well, so that if the state's own services didn't mea-
sure up, then the state (as service provider, but not as licensor of
41. Cf; Baird, supra note 25, at 2254 (suggesting "entirely private" filing
systems) Bowers, supra note 2, at 740-42 (considering the low-bidder option).
42. This access could probably take either of two forms. The licensee could
electronically transmit, with a specified degree of promptness, copies of its newly
received filings to one or more central public or private repositories, the records
of which would be searchable by third parties. In the alternative, the licensee
could maintain the sole record of the filings it received, but maintain electronic
connection to a specified network in order to accommodate searches of its own
records by remote parties. See Baird, supra note 25, at 2254 n.13 (suggesting
computers linked with common protocols).
Filing data should be regularly accessible, but probably need not be con-
stantly so. See Cuming, supra note 38, at 336 n.26 (noting that remote searches
in British Columbia are permitted 12 hours a day, six days a week).
43. Dr. Seuss is characteristically insightful on the subject of en-
trepreneurial zeal:
"You want stars like a Star-Belly Sneetch...?
My friends, you can have them for three dollars each!"
GEISEL, supra note 14, at 10.
"Belly stars are no longer in style," said McBean.
"What you need is a trip through my Star-Off Machine."
Id. at 17.
44. See Lynn M. LoPucli, Why the Debtor's State of Incorporation Should Be
the Proper Place for Article 9 Filing: A Systems Analysis, 79 MINN. L. REv. 577
(1995). This alteration of the place-of-filing rules would, of course, require filers
to know their debtors' jurisdiction of incorporation, one of the data protested
against in Part I. This requirement, however, would simultaneously eliminate
the other often more difficult to determine, place-of-filing knowledge that UCC
§ 9-103 currently requires of filers.
Even if a net increase in filer burden resulted from such a change in the
place-of-filing rules, it would be more acceptable than the burdens argued
against in Part I, not only because of the benefits Professor LoPucki describes,
but also because the purpose of this burden would not be to tax filers for the
benefit of searchers. (In a sense, however, all place-of-filing rules aid searchers.
A filing system that truly unaccommodating of searchers would include a choice-
of-law rule permitting filers to file wherever permitted by any state.)
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other service providers) would wither away. The quality of com-
peting performances would be measured by how well they accom-
modated the preferences of the consumers of the service (rather
than by any fixed "detailed description of the services that the
winning bidder was obliged to provide"45). The free market's ten-
dency to foster price and non-price competition is not a novel
point, but it is one that bears stressing46 as we attempt to reform
the system, and the possibilities that beckon are exhilarating to
speculate about, at least to us toilers in the vineyards. User-
friendly technology.4 7 Free Westlaw or LEXIS time for high-vol-
ume filers, or other lagniappes such as frequent flier miles.
Credit arrangements. 48 Search fees that vary depending on how
much detail the searcher requests beyond the secured party's
name and contact information.49 Pick-up service.50 Immediate
indexing of filings to permit immediate amendments or assign-
ments. Free post-filing searches. Optimal levels of off-site data
back-up. Ticklers concerning impending filing expirations. The
possibilities are limited only by the competitors' impatience with
the facts, i.e., with filers' and searchers' preferences.
These preferences are bound to be multifarious and even, as
between different filers or searchers, mutually contradictory.
They represent a set of facts that even the most patient drafts-
man would be unable to fix in statutory form with any useful
degree of particularity. How fortunate, then, that in this in-
stance the lesson derived from the facts is that we should keep
our cotton-picking statutory hands to ourselves, drafting instead
45. See Bowers, supra note 2, at 741.
46. Professor Bowers makes this point in his paper. Id. at 738 & n.45.
47. See Swift, supra note 32, at 287 (existing, markedly unfriendly technical
requirements).
48. British Columbia offers debit arrangements. ALCES & LLOYD, supra
note 32, at 21. But entrepreneurs would be more likely to offer the less con-
servative variation.
49. If higher search fees could be extracted from those wanting collateral
descriptions (or, for that matter, taxpayer identification numbers of debtors),
then the filing maintenance services could act as arbitrageurs in this informa-
tion market, encouraging filers to provide the non-mandatory information by
contracting to pass on to them a percentage of the higher search fees. Cf.
LoPucki, supra note 25, at 33-34 (discussing marketplace possibly leading to
optional filing of chain-of-title information).
50. Some Louisiana clerks apparently compete for filings by offering courier
services to high-volume filers. See Bowers, supra note 2, at 738. In response to
this evidence that even bureaucrats can, apparently, be taught to compete to
some degree, a cynic might echo Samuel Johnson: "'Sir, a woman's preaching is
like a dog's walking on his hinder legs. It is not done well; but you are surprized
to find it done at all.'" 1 JAMES BOSWELL, LiFE OF JoHNsoN 463 (G.B. Hill & L.F.
Powell eds., Oxford University Press 1934) (1791).
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an enabling rule that lets those closest to the facts accommodate
them as they see fit.
